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Prospects of establishing independent judiciary in the Republic of Uzbekistan[1]
1. Methodological approach to analyzing the issue of establishing an independent judiciary in the Republic of Uzbekistan.
From the methodological perspective, the issue of establishing an independent judiciary in the Republic of Uzbekistan under current conditions should be viewed based on three fundamental ideas which we think have to be considered as some sort of “working assumptions” (at least for the purposes of this analysis). They don’t need to be justified separately due to their theoretical self-evidence or because they were proved empirically. First point: a truly independent judiciary can, under no conditions, exist under authoritarian political regimes, which means that they are not compatible as such. In other words, an independent judiciary and an authoritarian political regime are two mutually exclusive notions. An authoritarian form of government[2] is a priori characterized by control over all branches of power and government institutions, including, of course, the judiciary. Otherwise, such form of government will no longer be authoritarian. There is no reason why we should not observe a strict authoritarian form of government with the personified presidential power in the Republic of Uzbekistan, and therefore, any hopes to possibly establish a Western-type independent judiciary in this country are mere illusions. The second point is based on the first point, moving from the objective perspective to the subjective one: in authoritarian political regimes there is no - and there can be no - political will aimed at establishing an independent judiciary. In other words, the first point is very obvious not only to outside observers or civil society, but to authorities themselves which, if they have to choose between authoritarianism and independent courts, opt for the inviolableness of their authoritarian power.[3] We cannot expect something totally different from an authoritarian political regime, since it would be a mere illusion, too. However, such lack of political will and political interest in establishing a truly and fully independent judiciary on the part of authoritarian governments does not mean that sometimes such governments cannot make certain positive steps toward providing courts with some elements of independence.[4] Such stimuli to establish an independent judiciary, which are always limited and do not contradict any of the aforementioned points (but rather make them somewhat less rigid), appear or may appear mostly in three cases. Firstly, it may happen due to the inevitable need faced by all governments, including authoritarian regimes, to maintain, at least somehow, the efficiency of criminal and civil justice. In this regard, an authoritarian government may allow, or even wish to have, some moderate elements of independence among judges in those cases (which are, for the most part, insignificant) that don’t have any political overtone to them and where serious economic issues are not involved. In other words, if authorities believe that a particular judicial reform is only technical, politically neutral and beneficial for society they may often agree to discuss, approve and even initiate it. Secondly, this may take place because all governments also strive, inevitably, for international prestige and legitimacy in front of the international community. At the present time, none of the political powers, at least in the former Soviet Union, proclaims and cannot proclaim openly its authoritarian nature or reluctance to follow the fundamental principles of international law, including an independent judiciary. Post-Soviet authoritarian states can no longer proclaim themselves an empire or an absolute monarchy, and they don’t have an opportunity to use old institutional theories that used to reject the idea of an independent judiciary and to view it as a derivative of monarchical power, as some sort of a delegated justice, etc. In this situation, they don’t have any chance to find some theoretical background in order to create an institutional system that would be harmonious with the authoritarian reality, and therefore, the current institutional system and reality inevitably contradict each other. Post-Soviet authoritarian states formally remain within the contemporary international and constitutional legal environment, and therefore, they have to juggle between law and reality, and occasionally (most often when pressured by the international community or in exchange for something) make some limited institutional concessions, including those related to an independent judiciary. The first two stimuli to some restricted independence of the judiciary are clear to authorities themselves and international experts, and more often than not they account for all hypothetical positive reforms meant to make judges independent which take place in post-Soviet authoritarian states after the disbandment of the Soviet Union. However, thirdly, there is one more potential incentive for authoritarian governments to develop a certain willingness to conduct positive judicial reforms, although this incentive is not properly conceptualized theoretically in post-Soviet states and probably not realized by those in power. By this we mean that independent courts trusted by the public are the only institutional safeguard in overcoming political crises that nowadays occur in authoritarian states during almost all elections. Authorities in post-Soviet states haven’t realized yet that any elections, excluding Soviet-type elections with only one party and one candidate, can be nothing but a political conflict, and the only way to solve this conflict that would help avoid chaos and unrest is an independent judiciary recognized by both parties to this conflict. That is why such chaos and turmoil do not exist in countries with a highly developed judicial system, no matter how heated political confrontation is. Similarly, that is why chaos and disorder become, sooner or later, inevitable in those countries where the only way to overcome political conflict is police repressions. If there is no independent judiciary, authorities will always have to “chase” new revolutionary technologies by introducing, post factum, while looking at outdated technoligies used in other countries, various, often inane, police measures restricting the activities of non-governmental organizations, limiting the use of the Internet, etc. It is not that incumbent authorties are not able to win elections, but rather, if there is no independent judiciary, they don’t have any chance to justify their vicotry legitimately in front of the public. This definitely leads to some social outburst, which is a matter of time. In this sense, an independent judiciary should be viewed as the only political alternative to various chaotic expressions of public anger and the only guarantee of a country’s step-by-step non-revolutionary development. To a certain degree, and in general, such a hidden, and not yet realized by authorities in post-Soviet countries, stimulus to conduct a judicial reform and to create an independent judiciary can be presented as "independent judiciary vs. colour revolution.” Third point: conducting extensive political reforms[5] in the absence of properly developed judicial institutions and clear ideas about how to create them as soon as possible and how they should function makes no sense, and sometimes it is even dangerous. In other words, a new political system cannot function without an appropriate framework. Since in post-Soviet countries this framework cannot be taken from the old system and used immediately by the new system, i.e. it cannot be inherited naturally (it never existed during the Soviet epoch and wasn’t created after the disbandment of the Soviet Union), it should be designed before conducting political reforms. Furthermore, it should be designed taking into account local conditions, using those legal constructs and institutions that, due to some historical circumstances, already exist in the national law, either in reality or just formally, are legitimated in the minds of lawyers and/or the public, are technically correct and compliant with international standards. Those legal constructs and institutions that do not meet these requirements should be identified, modified theoretically or abolished, while missing constructs and institutions should added, again theoretically at this point. While this institutional designing is going on, new lawyers at the national level should be trained, supporting the ideas of potential judicial institutions and understanding their meaning. If we neglect the third point mentioned above, political reforms are often doomed to be unsuccessful, despite certain plausible goals pursued by the reformers. If there is no appropriate judicial framework, a new political system will not be able to function effectively during the post-reform period. This will either lead to a permanent institutional chaos, or the state, while looking for effective measures, will go back to authoritarian police governance methods followed by economically and legally unjustified interference with the economy. Any chance of social stabilization provided by political reforms will be lost, while society starts questioning, which is as alarming, not only these political reforms, but also their underlying ideas (democracy, liberalism, multi-party representation, etc.) Empirically, the post-Soviet practice has proved many times the irrevocability of adverse repercussions for a particular society if the third point is neglected. We also see multiple examples of the two possible consequences, an institutional chaos and a partial step back to authoritarianism, while sometimes they may occur at the same time. As an example, we would like to demonstrate two private cases, when there was a positive political will and favourable political trends, but certain institutional mistakes that took place due to insufficient integration of post-Soviet legal ideas (which remained Soviet among some concrete individuals) in the international intellectual and legal environment entailed some clearly negative consequences in terms of political and economic development in certain countries. These problems remain unsolved today. The first example is the Russian Civil Code adopted in the mid-1990s, which was later copied by many post-Soviet states. In this Code, a very important and laudable task of developing the market economy was followed by recognizing the state as the subject of private law (sic!), and it was done not because of someone’s ill intent, but due to somewhat incorrect and/or outdated comparative and legal ideas among those who drafted the Code. At the same time, instead of commerce and administrative courts with clear competence in the private and public fields respectively, some private and public (civil and administrative) arbitration courts with no clear competence were established. In some countries, including Uzbekistan, they were called economic courts. Should we be surprised and feel angered, which is the case with those who drafted the Russian Civil Code, for example, because the state, officially allowed to enter the market as the “subject of civil law,” forced out other actors in no time at all and started dominating there? It is not surprising that arbitration (economic) courts turned into some sort of monsters serving the state, gaining, little by little, and among other things, certain criminal (sic!) authority in the form of imposing administrative sanctions. Another example is a vulgarized understanding of administrative justice from the substantive perspective (i.e. courts controlling the administration), which is devoid of any theoretically verified institutional limitations, formed in Ukraine during its recent history and significantly undermining the effective development of the political system. Driven by the correct and fair assumption that actions of public officials can be complained against by citizens in courts, Ukrainian policy-makers started interpreting it too broadly and in the absolute sense. They started using this assumption, for example, to complain against the President’s decision to dissolve the Parliament in a City Administrative Court, or to square their political accounts with someone, etc. As a result of this specific understanding of administrative justice, the institutional chaos not only didn’t mitigate, but even became worse.[6] Obviously, no state in the world will be able to function properly when any individual or political figure have the right to approach city or district courts and to appeal, for example, against the decisions of the Head of State on appointing some Minister, dissolving the Parliament, etc., when an average judge starts evaluating their “legitimacy” and “validity,” and when the decisions of this average judge become subject to review by courts of other instances, etc. It is clear that this issue in the West was comprehended a long time ago and gradually conceptualized for the purpose of finding a reasonable balance between the fundamental right to seek judicial protection and the need for effective political governance.[7] It is also clear that the lack of a comprehensible institutional doctrine of administrative justice means that when the relevant right to appeal the actions of public officials is proclaimed years or even decades may pass to find the best institutional framework with all appropriate risks and consequences (political chaos, return to authoritarian methods, forced neglect of appropriate judicial decisions repealing strictly political presidential decrees, pressure on judges, etc). Given appropriate institutional designing and required competence, a decision in this situation (taking into account the comparative and legal experience) could be received in advance, explicated doctrinally, and made known to citizens and parties to a political process, etc. Going back to the issue of establishing an independent judiciary in Uzbekistan which stands out among other post-Soviet states in terms of personalities and trends, and not from the institutional perspective, and also based on the aforementioned points, we can make the following conclusions that may serve as a methodological basis for conducting relevant reforms: - establishing a fully independent judiciary in an authoritarian environment is an illusion and a far-fetched task; - even in an authoritarian environment there are certain possibilities, and some limited improvement of the judiciary is feasible, which can be aimed at providing judges with more independence (local reforms); - the number of such possibilities from the viewpoint of their increase and success of local reforms largely depend on how deeply those in power perceive the idea of independent courts as the only alternative to any grassroots social unrest, no matter what it looks like, that would be legitimate in the eyes of the international community; - within this realm of possibilities, local reforms should be used for the purpose of partial institutional normalization, i.e. creating separate institutional elements that can later be used to form a full-fledged independent judiciary; - beyond this realm of possibilities, a comprehensive doctrinal normalization is required, i.e. developing a full-fledged design of an independent judiciary that can later be used in the environment of conducting a hypothetical political reform; - developing a full-fledged doctrinal design should be followed by a progressive preparation, in various forms, of national lawyers who would be ready to perceive it and understand the underlying idea and meaningfulness of reforms.
2. Typology of legal deformations in the Uzbek judicial system impeding the development of an independent judiciary and requiring institutional normalization One of the issues relating to almost all attempts to establish an independent judiciary in post-Soviet countries (and which should preferably be avoided in Uzbekistan) is an insufficiently clear conceptualization of the subject that should be reformed. It is impossible, in the absence of such conceptualization, to set the task appropriately and to determine precisely the reform agenda and strategy (in the short-term and long-term perspectives). If we assume that reforms are required not just to eliminate some minor “shortcomings” (in this case we would be dealing with routine legislative improvements, as it has always been called during the Soviet and post-Soviet periods), but to overcome certain deep deformations of Uzbekistan’s judicial system, then such deformations are not homogeneous. As a result, the means and methods which will be used to overcome them should not be homogeneous either (in other words, means and methods of institutional normalization). In general, we can distinguish two major types of institutional and legal deformations at the theoretical level which a priori may hamper the establishment of an independent judiciary. At the empirical level, these two types of deformations are easily recognized in Uzbekistan’s judicial system. For the purposes of this paper, let us call them simple deformations and complex deformations. A simple deformation is characterized by the following major features which make it possible to differentiate it from complex deformations: a) it can be eliminated through a one-time regulatory and legal interference, i.e. it would be enough to either amend a law or adopt a new law in order to do away with it; b) it can be a necessary condition to establish an independent judiciary, but is never a sufficient condition; c) its presence is more or less obvious to any educated post-Soviet lawyer, i.e. the criticism of this deformation is compatible with the post-Soviet legal mentality and does not require any excessive intellectual efforts. A complex deformation is identified by the opposite: а) it cannot be eliminated through a one-time regulatory interference, including adoption of a new comprehensive codified act; b) it is both necessary and sufficient in order to establish an independent judiciary, i.e. if it is overcome, the goal of the judicial reform will be achieved; c) it is not obvious to the overwhelming majority of post-Soviet lawyers (regardless of their political views, be they right-wing, left-wing, liberal, conservative, etc), who do not view it as a deformation, but rather a norm. Interestingly, almost any discourse in post-Soviet countries related to the judicial reform and independence of judges is confined to discussing how to overcome simple deformations. Even the most radical suggestions are, for all intents and purposes, just a set of technical decisions within the necessary, but not sufficient, measures (and sometimes even this is not true). It cannot be otherwise, taking into account the aforementioned signs of both types of deformations, such as obviousness and eliminability of simple deformations and unobviousness and poor eliminability of complex deformations. Only through separating simple and complex deformations from one another, which presuppose different methods and even timelines of institutional normalization, will we able to avoid the excessive optimism among those who propose concrete steps toward reforms and pessimism of those who excoriates the former for “ungrounded illusions.” Apparently, it is through understanding the nature of one or another deformation correctly that we will be able to determine precisely the reform agenda and strategy. The elimination of simple deformations is possible, and should preferably be done, in he short-term perspective, whereas the full-scale elimination of complex deformations requires not only a long-term programme of legislative decisions, but also long-lasting doctrinal and educational efforts. In other words, in the last case scenario, a more thorough academic preparation is absolutely required that would allow to detect and systematize complex deformations. It is also important to conduct educational activities along with it that would enable to train national lawyers, for who such deformations will no longer be a norm, but rather deformations that need to be eliminated. Otherwise, even if someone is, with the help of, for instance, international experts, able to do the impossible hypothetically, i.e. solving the issue of a one-time regulatory elimination of complex deformations (by, for example, total dismantling and replacing of the legal system), without any doctrinal and educational preparation (which should not be indiscriminate, but rather continuous), such legal novelties will not be understood or will be distorted at the law enforcement level. In this regard, a complex deformation should never be viewed as a simple deformation. They cannot be confused or interchanged.[8] It is also obvious that in an authoritarian environment the realm of possibilities (see above) includes only overcoming some simple deformations. It is in this area that reformers should work the most, since a full elimination of complex deformations entails the true establishment of an independent judiciary, a judicial power that would, by its very nature, be incompatible with such form of government (also see above). At the same time, this authoritarian period can be used to reveal doctrinally and conceptualize complex deformations, taking into account the above-mentioned third point and the need to support academically their institutional normalization. In the long run, only after overcoming complex deformations will we be able to talk about the true judicial reform. Using this expression while talking about the elimination of simple deformations (particularly partial elimination) is not only unfounded theoretically, but also dangerous, because it leads reformers away from their actual goal and enables those in power to use this term as a way of populism, confining themselves to show half-measures.
It is impossible to analyze the typology of institutional deformations of the judicial legal system of any post-Soviet state, including the Republic of Uzbe kistan, without taking into account one more criterion that can be conditionally called historic. This criterion itself is evident and does not cause difficulties. According to it, all deformations of the judicial-legal system by Uzbekistan can be divided into Soviet deformations inherited from the Soviet past and post-Soviet deformations caused by the development of post-Soviet authoritarianism. Soviet deformations are universal for all post-Soviet states while post-Soviet deformations already often have a national slant, although here a certain “universalism” (both positive and clearly negative) connected with comparative legal influences within the post-Soviet space can also be found. There is a very important fact that complex deformations are more often Soviet deformations or can be explained by the Soviet past - this is why, as was mentioned earlier, they are difficult to overcome, first of all from the mental point of view, but then they are more or less neutral for post-Soviet regimes. It significantly simplifies their identification and their doctrinal criticism, since the authorities in power do not perceive such criticism as an encroachment on their foundations. Complex deformations of post-Soviet origin, of course, also can be found, although as an exception only. At the same time, in the absence of proper reforms, a steady growth of their numbers can be forecasted. This growth can be explained by both political factors because of which they are not politically neutral a priori and by gross errors in the institutional-legal planning during the transition from the Soviet legal system to the systems of the Western model. Yet, post-Soviet deformations are still more often simple deformations - that’s why the overcoming of such deformations is not so much an institutional problem, given their brief history and the rejection of them (or, at least, realization) by the majority of educated lawyers, as it often is a political problem. For the authorities in power these deformations, as a rule, are not so politically neutral as are Soviet deformations. Of course, simple deformations of Soviet origin also can be found, but their numbers are steadily decreasing, since they are, but again, for the most part, politically neutral for the modern power and can be relatively easily overcome (that was, by the way, the overcoming of these deformations the main focus of post-Soviet procedural reforms was directed to). At the same time there are some Soviet deformations that simultaneously are both simple and complex, i.e. it is somewhat difficult to apply the proposed typologization to them. They can be considered simple because they are capable of being easily removed by a single act/regulation and are necessary but an insufficient condition of ensuring the independence of judges (have first and second signs of simple deformations). But, at the same time, due to their long history, they “took so deep roots” in the mentality of post-Soviet lawyers that they became an absolute norm for them. Thus, by the third sign they lose the property of simple deformations becoming complicated deformations. However, from the methodological considerations, we will regard them as simple deformations, considering that capability to be removed by a single act/regulation is dominant for the purposes of this analysis. Thus, all institutional deformations that impede the formation of an independent judiciary in the Republic of Uzbekistan can be divided into simple and complex. Both of these deformations are divided, by a historical criterion, into Soviet and post-Soviet. By using “from the simple to the complex” principle which, to some extent, corresponds to an optimal program of the judicial reform with its division into short-term and long-term prospects we first will consider concrete post-Soviet simple deformations of the Uzbekistan judicial-legal system, then - its simple Soviet deformations to dwell on the most fundamental, in our opinion, complex deformations (post-Soviet and Soviet) without the elimination of which an independent judicial power in Uzbekistan can hardly come about.
3. Simple deformations of the Uzbek judicial system that impede the formation of an independent judiciary.
A) Simple deformations of the Uzbek judicial-legal system of post-Soviet origin.
The main problem of the newest Uzbek legislation that regulates the status of judges is the increasing subjection of the latter to the control of the executive power, first of all on the part of the President of the country. Moreover, on the one hand there is a clearly evident attempt to preserve some norms and democratic-oriented institutions introduced in the first years after gaining independence and on the other hand - to circumvent these norms through creating more or less “disguised” specific institutional “constructions” that do not meet international requirements and standards. International standards for ensuring the principle of independence of judges - the principle proclaimed in articles 106 and 112 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan - require the main role when forming judiciary and controlling it (selection of judges, charging them from office, holding them liable, etc.) to belong to a judicial community body independent of the rest authorities. It seems that the Uzbek authorities are aware of such international standards - that is why the system of Qualification Boards of Judges created soon after gaining the independence is now in place in Uzbekistan (see Regulation on Qualification Boards of Judges in the acting edition approved by Resolution of the Parliament of December 7, 2001). On the whole, the institution itself of Qualification Boards of Judges does not rouse censure from the point of view of the independence of judges, keeping in mind, above all else, that Qualification Boards are genuine bodies of the judicial community that are formed by appropriate judicial meetings (the Plenary Session of the Supreme Court of the RU, other courts conferences, etc.) exclusively from among judges themselves. It does not necessarily mean that the Uzbek institution of Qualification Boards does not have certain drawbacks. Say, doubts can arise about the justification of the separate concurrent existence of Qualification Boards of Judges of general jurisdiction courts and judges of economic courts; formation of the Supreme Qualification Board of Judges (SQBJ) exclusively from among judges of the Supreme Court (and not from among representatives of all judiciary), which transforms it from a judicial community body into all but a subdivision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan - some kind of “disciplinary board” the decisions of which are without appeal, etc. Theoretically, these drawbacks should be removed, however, they are not an insuperable obstacle on the way to forming an independent judiciary in Uzbekistan. But other dangerous tendency is really an obstacle - the marginalization of the Qualification Boards and creation of an institutional superstructure in the form of the High Qualification Commission for Selection and Recommendation for Offices of Judges Attached to the President of the RU (further referred to as High Qualification Commission, Commission or HQCSROJ) that, in fact, destroys their independence. The creation of this Commission was a result of a certain evolution that reflects, by all appearances, a disturbing attempt of the political power to subject the judiciary to its total control making the legal regulation rather difficult to preserve appearances of compliance to the international standards (this method of legal regulation often practiced within the post-Soviet space can be designated as a method of «developing regulatory schemes for circumventing some or other universal principle or guarantee», alternative to their formal and undisguised abolishment). In particular, first, resolution of the President of the RU of July 30, 1999 "On creation of Commission for dealing with issues related to appointment and dismissal of judges» was adopted, then the resolution was replaced with the decree of the President of the RU of May 4, 2000 «On creation of HQCSROJ”. Finally, at the present time, High Qualification Commission reached even more high level of institutionalization acting under the Regulation “On HQCSROJ” approved by the decree of the President of RU of March 17, 2006. Two facts do not raise any doubts. First, the HQCSROJ is an instrument of the presidential power. This is evidenced by both the regulatory control of its activity (presidential decrees) and a direct indication in clause 2 of the Regulation of March 17, 2006 that the HQCSROJ is a “constantly acting body attached to the President of the RU”. In fact, not even the traditional and somewhat hypocritical cliché that the Commission is created for “executing the policy of ensuring the true (sic!) independence of the judiciary” can convincingly argue otherwise. The connection of the Commission with the executive power is also evidenced by its composition that, by the way, is approved by the President himself of the RU. In the composition of the Commission one can find representatives of the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Justice, the Prosecutor General’s Office, and other “qualified specialists”. The inclusion of deputies and representatives of the Supreme Court and Higher Economic Court by no means indicates the “democratic character” of the Commission as Uzbek political elites would think, but it does indicate the full blending of all branches of power, their subjection to the presidential power and marginalization of the judiciary that is forced to take part in sessions of commissions together with policemen, prosecutors and other officials. Second, the HQCSROJ subjected to its total control such bodies of the judicial community as Qualification Boards of Judges, depriving them of all independence. Moreover, it is not only and not so much a covertly political subjection as it is open formally institutional subjection. In particular, according to clauses 5 - 7, 24 of the Regulation “On HQCSROJ” “the commission is vested with key powers with regards to determination of candidates of judges and premature termination of judges”, it is “the last authority that prepares recommendations for appointment of judges”, exercises control over the activity of Qualification Boards of Judges, “gives recommendations to improve their activity”, “hears reports of the chairpersons of Qualification Boards of Judges”, “assigns matters to qualified judges”, etc. Moreover, already on a strictly personal level the HQCSROJ not only “hears systematically reports of the chairpersons of the Qualification Boards of Judges concerning work with judicial manpower”, but it has the right to submit a written presentation concerning holding the chairperson of the relevant Qualification Board liable, up to his or her dismissal from office (!) (clause 8 of the Regulation of Qualification Boards of Judges). Basically, in Uzbekistan, the judicial community bodies have exclusively auxiliary role in the process of assignment, reassignment and dismissal of judges from office. Say, they can form a “reserve of candidates for judges”, although even in this case Qualification Boards act under the “watchful eye” of the HQCSROJ on whom they also find themselves, in an administrative and disciplinary manner, dependent. If we look closer at these two above-mentioned facts, it will become clear that in Uzbekistan the judicial community bodies are not only dependent, but they are in direct hierarchical subjection to the presidential power represented by the HQCSROJ. At the same time it would be incorrect to think that the activity of the HQCSROJ is limited to the control over the activity of the judicial community bodies when selecting, assigning, reassigning and dismissing judges from office. To the same degree, it touches courts and judges when they directly administer justice. In particular, according to the Law of the RU of September 2, 1993 “On Courts” (in acting edition) it is entrusted with organizational ensuring of activity of courts. Given that material and technical maintenance of activity of courts is performed by special authorized bodies attached to the Ministry of Justice that act under the Regulation approved by the President of the RU, who also approves the structure and the number of employees of the Supreme Court of the RU, space for any independence is very limited. But the most shocking provision of the newest Uzbek legislation on the status of judges is the institution of court inspection attached to the same HQCSROJ, i.e. it belongs to the presidential power. The composition of the court inspection headed by two members of the HQCSROJ and including besides them 4 mysterious “leading inspectors” speaks for itself. The President of the RU personally appoints members of the court inspection. There is no doubt that this is the body for direct control and subjection of active judges, since the court inspection “analyzes how judges observe their oath of office”, takes measures (!) to prevent violation of the judicial ethics”, “gives its opinion regarding candidates of judges”, etc. (clause 38 of the Regulation on HQCSROJ). It is not very difficult to guess what measures the court inspection takes to “prevent”, say, violations of the judicial ethics if, according to other very eloquent provision of the above-mentioned Regulation, it should “respect the honor and dignity of judges, observe professional confidentiality, etc.” Such reservation is only possible when it is a mysterious secret police which acts as one of the presidential structures to control the judiciary. If it exists, there is, in fact, no point in further discussing the independence of Uzbek judges.
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