In this situation, the foremost measure to take to potentially form an independent judiciary in Uzbekistan is the abolishment of the HQCSROJ and the court inspection attached to it. At the same time it is necessary to specially discuss the issue regarding what powers of the HQCSROJ should pass to Qualification Boards and what powers should disappear at all. In any case, the powers of the court inspection belong to the second category. Moreover, reconstruction of the role of the Qualification Boards does not eliminate at all the issue regarding optimization of their status and the procedure of their formation that should include the international guarantees in order to remove relevant drawbacks (see above). It is equally important to begin to discuss the issue of correct interpretation of the institution of “assignment of judges by the head of state”, although in this case we talk about overcoming of a complex deformation, not a simple one (see further), which suggests exclusively doctrinal level of discussion and the absence of unjustified illusion of quick results. Another problem that requires parallel, but not necessarily simultaneous, solution is strengthening the status of appointed judges. First of all, it is necessary to refuse the most odious provisions that almost fully neutralize the institution of immunity of judges. In particular, at the present time, intrusion into the home or office, search, seizure, eavesdropping on telephone conversations and other similar actions against judges are performed with the sanction of the prosecutor (art. 70 of the Law of the RU “On Courts”), which completely contravenes the principle of the independence of judges contained in the international law and in the Constitution. It is clear that permission to perform such actions should be given only by the judicial community bodies, otherwise we can forget about the independence of judges. Moreover, the most important task to be accomplished during the upcoming period of potential reforms is introduction of the institution of irremovability of judges in Uzbekistan. At the present time they are appointed for the term of 5 years after which they undergo the procedure of “reassignment” passing again the qualification examination, going “through the sieve” of the Qualification Boards and the HQCSROJ, etc. But even during 5 years the judge cannot even theoretically work calmly and independently, since he or she is always under institutional administrative pressure in the form of the “qualification certification”, “qualification classes”, etc. Thus, when 3 years after appointment to office have passed, i.e. long before the expiration of the term of office, the judge should undergo the qualification certification for which it is necessary to present a «report on the judge» (!) and a testimonial from the relevant chairperson of the court. (clauses 28 and 35 of the Regulation «On Qualification Boards of Judges»). This procedure can have only one purpose - to turn the judge into a subordinate person. The institution of «qualification classes» is subject to the same logic and even its symbols and vocabulary resemble those used in the army (for instance, the phrase “term of validity of qualification classes”). In particular, according to the Regulation «On qualification classes of judges» approved by resolution of the Parliament of December 14, 2000 there are six qualification classes in Uzbekistan and the highest qualification class is assigned personally by the President of the RU (it is something like the rank of a general). These classes create an additional system of incentives for the judge through influencing the salary and by turning, in necessary cases, into promotion (assignment of a qualification class) or sanction (withdrawal of the qualification class), i.e. they make the judicial activity bureaucratic and transform the judge, according to the intention of the authorities, into an obedient and subordinate official. For court employees (clerks) there is a separate bureaucratic and military-like «table of ranks» named the system of class ranks. It, of course, is less shocking, however, it also contributes to the bureaucratization of the judicial system, especially if we take into account «insignia» for every class rank (clause 14 of the Regulation «On Class ranks of court employees»... approved by resolution of the Parliament of December 14, 2000), i.e. some kind of «epaulets» for judges.[9] In such situation, introduction of the institution of irremovability of judges, i.e. lifetime appointment of judges (up to reaching a certain age) should be among top priority measures. But also there should be a comprehensive list of grounds for premature dismissal from office provided by the law and a decision regarding premature dismissal from office should be taken by the appropriate body of the judicial community (Qualification Board). Simultaneously, the institutions of qualification certification, qualification classes, and class ranks (for court employee) should be abolished completely. Possible financial losses of active judges should be compensated by conversion of relevant benefits into regular and stable salary. Any objections that the abolishment of the qualification certification, qualification examination when reassigning, etc. will negatively influence the professional training of judges cannot be taken into account. First, the work of judges is definitely a complex intellectual activity and a bureaucratic control over it cannot be effective even theoretically (a judge, like a scientist or a university professor, cannot be subjected to a constant professional control). Control over the professional level of the judge can be only procedural (from a court of superior jurisdiction when hearing complaints) or intellectual without the participation of any institution (from the civil society and legal science). Second, even when in individual specific cases a theoretically possible contradiction can arise between the independence of the judge and the control over his or her professional competence (independence vs. control over competence) priority should be given to the imperative of ensuring the independence of the judge, since the absence of the independence is a system-based institutional vice while incompetence is a random and personal vice, which of course does not mean that ways for optimization of a certain control over competence when forming judiciary should not be discussed at the institutional level. Another problem connected with the bureaucratization of the judiciary and the one that extremely negatively influences the independence of judges is related to the excessive role of the chairperson of courts in the Uzbek judicial system. The current Uzbek judicial legislation views the chairpersons of the courts less in the traditional spirit of primus inter pares (first among equals) when the chairperson is vested with certain special powers that, for the most part, are exclusively technical or ceremonial and do not infringe the powers and the status of other judges, and more as the “superior” (with regard to the judges of “his” or “her” court) and, simultaneously, as the “subordinate” (with regard to higher judges); thus, the chairperson is part of the bureaucratic, hierarchic system. In other words, these are the functions of the chairperson of the court that, to the significant degree, transform the Uzbek judicial system from a procedural system into a bureaucratic one. In particular, on the one hand, in the Uzbek legislation there is, say, a system of “reports” when at the session of the higher court the administrative reports of the chairpersons of the inferior court concerning the results of the work, work performance, quantity of the reversed judgments, etc. are considered (see, for example, art. 17, 24 of the Law of the RU “On Courts”). On the other hand, the chairperson of the court has clearly institutional means of pressure on the other judges of this court. If we even do not go back to his prerogative when conducting, say, the qualification certification of judges (see above), etc. it is sufficient to say that the chairperson of the court has the right to bring the judges to disciplinary liability “for violation of legality” and, what is more, one of the measures of such liability is a fine (!) (see clauses 38 and 44 of the Regulation “On Qualification Boards of Judges”). It is clear that any attempt to show independence in such situation will be suppressed through the personal initiative of the chairperson of the court or “through him” under the initiative of higher judges to whom the chairperson regularly gives account. We do remember that, first of all, the total bureaucratization of the judiciary is, in the aggregate, not a simple deformation but a complex one to which we will have to go back later and that a number of powers of the chairpersons of the courts are inherited from the Soviet law (we will go back to them too) it is necessary as one of the top priority measures to perform a complex revision of the Uzbek judicial legislation in order to free it from all post-Soviet additions that strengthen bureaucratic functions of the chairpersons of the courts and their subordinate role with regard to higher courts. Every such addition should be considered as a simple deformation requiring an immediate overcoming. In the Uzbek judicial system, higher courts should not “hear” reports of the chairpersons of the inferior courts, the chairpersons of the courts should not have special powers to bring other judges to disciplinary liability[10] and there should not be any similar measures. Another problem is that the principles of separation of powers and independence of judges proclaimed in the Constitution of the RU are ignored not only on the fundamental level (from the point of view of the status of judges) but also on the level that would seem to be simply technical. In particular, for example, under Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of March 18, 2003 a foundation of the development of courts and judicial bodies was created in Uzbekistan and, what is more, it was created, in principle, with a good purpose - to improve the material and technical base of courts and the monetary pay of judges. In particular, a certain percent of monetary fines collected by courts, of litigation fees, etc. should be transferred to the foundation to be used for the material and technical development of courts (repair of buildings, purchase of equipment, etc.) and for payments to judges (additional incentives, additional payments etc.). It is clear that despite the supposedly good intentions this idea itself is absolutely vicious, since it is directed to the creation a punitive motivation for the judge. Can the judge be absolutely impartial, considering a case regarding the levy of a large fine, if he or she knows that if the fine is levied, the judiciary will receive a corresponding addition to their budgetary funds and if he or she does not levy a fine there will be no monetary addition? And the bigger is the amount of the levy, the better will be the financial situation of the judiciary as a whole and of the individual judge in particular. But the organization of the foundation is more surprising: it is led by the supervisory council headed by the Minister of Justice and this council has among its members the chairpersons of the Supreme Court and the Higher Economic Court (clause 8 of the Regulation “On the Foundation”). In other words, the leaders of the highest judicial bodies of the country are under direct subordination to the line minister. Against this background the fact that the supervisory council of the foundation (among members of which there are highest judges of the country) sends regular reports to the administration of the President of the RU is almost a “trifle”. Another, albeit less shocking, example is the activity of the Center for monitoring the realization of standard legal acts attached to the Ministry of Justice that was created pursuant to the President’s Decree as of December 15, 2006. Once again, this Center was established with a fairly good and exclusively analytical purpose. However, if we look closer, we will see that the Center should, in particular, “exercise a constant control over to what extent standard legal acts are realized in the course of the activity of the ministries, state committees, departments […] judicial bodies, subdivisions of the Ministry of Justice… ”. The enumeration of supposedly “independent” courts (“judicial bodies”) in one line with ministries, departments and even subdivisions of the Ministry of Justice speaks for itself. But even more important thing is that there is an evident attempt to officially introduce police bureaucratic methods of control over judicial activity, which does not correspond at all to the principle of the independence of judges. Even if we suppose that the political power was guided by the best intentions to optimize the judicial practice, analysts with class ranks, insignia, etc. should not, in any case, be considered as a substitute for complex and laborious doctrinal (scientific) work for evaluation and crystallization of judicial decisions and, what is more, we have already pointed to the theoretical lameness of any attempts of a bureaucratic intellectual control. On the whole, it is clear that among the top priority measures for ensuring the independence of judges in Uzbekistan there also are a speedy abolishment of the Foundation for the development of judges and judicial bodies. The state should give a good financial support to the courts and judges, however, a complex work on the formation of the state budget and stable funding of the judicial system cannot be replaced with any attempts to put the judges on partial “self-support and self-financing” if one recalls a well-known Soviet term. As for the Center for monitoring of realization of standard-legal acts we do not say that it should be abolished completely, since we do not deny the necessity of watching the realization of standard legal acts by officials of different levels. However, such Center can only act within the framework of the executive power and should not touch the judiciary as a whole and judges in particular, i.e. the status of the Center should be brought in line with this requirement as soon as possible. As for judges, a non-procedural control over the quality of their decisions is a task for an academic doctrine only and this doctrine, frankly speaking, does not deal with it at the present time. However, this problem is among complex deformations and we will have to go back to it.
B). Simple deformations of the Uzbek judicial-legal system of Soviet origin. The majority of deformations of Soviet origin that impede the formation of an independent judiciary in Uzbekistan have a mixed nature and touch both the legislation in question on the status of judges and purely procedural mechanisms and institutions regulated by criminal procedural legislation, civil legislation, economic procedural legislation, etc. This makes us specify two things. First, we, here, cannot discuss in detail the problem with optimization of the relevant processes - it is a too difficult and extensive problem. We will only discus in brief the procedural institutions that need a careful analysis and reforming and are reflected directly in the legislation on the courts and judges. Second, the removal of the relevant deformations that impede an institutional independence of judges requires not only amendments, say, in the Law of the RU “On Courts”, but also requires preparation of a new Code of the Criminal Procedure, new Code of Civil Procedure, etc. (or, at least, their new editions), which is a complex, laborious and relatively long work. So we think that the overcoming of the deformations described below is among task of the second priority - it does not mean that they do not need an immediate removal, but it does mean that an immediate removal of them (among the top priority measures) is technically impossible. The main problem of the Uzbek legislation of soviet origin that makes the transition to a genuinely independent court difficult and that can be considered according to the capability of being removed by a single act/regulation as a “simple deformation” is connected with the procedural institution of review of judicial decisions in the exercise of the supervisory power. What is more, up to now this institution in Uzbekistan exists not in a softened “post-Soviet” form, as in some Post-Soviet states where it is turned into an ordinary way of review of judicial decisions, but in its paradigmatic soviet form incompatible with an independence of the judiciary. This is the procedural institution of “supervision” that explains a shocking from the point of view of the principle of the independence of judges provision that the Supreme Court of the RU has the right “to supervise the judicial activity of the inferior courts” which is reflected not only in the legislation (art. 13 of the Law of the RU “On courts”) but also in the Constitution of the RU (art. 10). It is this provision that explains many excessive powers of the chairpersons of the courts of the highest and medium level (and also of deputies of the former): to register, under personal initiative, protests against decisions of the inferior courts that entered into force, to suspend the enforcement of the court decisions, to require the court to return the case (art. 26 and 34 of the Law of the RU “On courts”). By the way, the same problem also touches the system of economic courts that were created in the post-Soviet period and adopted the soviet system of “supervision”. In such situation we should not only refuse the “soviet supervision” together with which all cited provisions of the Law “On courts” will also disappear. We need a new institutional modeling of the procedural system which, at the present time, has obvious drawbacks that, in the end, affect the independence of judges. For example, we should refuse the powers of the Supreme Court to hear the case as a court of the first instance and as a result of which it itself has to review its decisions in appeal procedure or in cassational procedure (art. 13 of the Law of the RU “On courts”). This provision definitely has no institutional logic. If we think in a more general sense, the principle itself of blending of different powers of instances in one branch of the judicial system when one court can be a court of first instance, of appeal instance, of cassational instance (let alone supervisory instance) (see also art. 30 of the Law of the RU “On courts”) deserves a critical rethinking, since it does not form an institutional base for creation of procedural conditions for the independence of judges. We should replace it with another principle - one branch, one instance. However, although more detailed discussion of these problems is necessary we cannot continue it here since it belongs to a purely procedural area which is not a subject of this analysis. The most serious non-procedural deformation of Soviet origin perceived as almost an indispensable legal standard by the majority of post-Soviet lawyers is the right of the Supreme Court of the RU to give the inferior courts so-called “guiding instructions” (art. 13 of the Law of the RU “On courts”), i.e. the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the RU can issue decrees that are regulatory and abstract by their nature and obligatory for all courts and judges. We will dwell on the nature of this phenomenon further, since it is a reflection of a deeper phenomenon - regulatory bureaucratization of the judicial activity. This phenomenon is definitely a complex deformation of the Uzbek judicial-legal system. But this does not impede us to consider the specific provision itself on “the right to guiding instructions” as a simple deformation, since its abolishment (by amending art. 13 of the Law “On courts”) does not involve any technical difficulties. In any case, the institution of “decrees of the Plenum of the Supreme Court” despite all its traditional character and strong penetration of national-legal mentality is an indisputable obstacle on the way to the independence of judges in the Republic of Uzbekistan - it is incompatible with a genuine independence of the judiciary. In conclusion, we will pay our attention to one more manifestation of the “Soviet legacy” - cases related to the “state secrets” are within competence of military courts (art.41 of the Law of the RU “On judges”). Based on the uniformity of the status of all Uzbek judges and their equal degree of independence it is impossible to explain the meaning of this provision, since not all “secrets” are connected with the military sphere and being in the military service by itself does not give any special knowledge in the area of the “state secrets”. The legislator proclaims the right principles on the “uniformity of the status”, “independence”, etc. at the same time reveals its true intentions by disproving these principles in the specific provisions in which an obvious preference is given to those judges who are considered more “reliable”, i.e. more dependent. It seems that we should refuse the special competence of the military courts when considering cases related to the “state secrets” as did legislators in many other post-Soviet countries, which did not cause any national catastrophe anywhere.
4. Complex deformations of the Uzbek judicial-legal system that impede the formation of an independent judiciary. First of all, it should be noted that any “complex deformation” of the judicial-legal system is within not only internal institutional-legal sphere, but also far beyond its limits - in political area, social area, etc. However, we, taking this into account, from purely methodological considerations, do not consider here inevitable and very important external institutional effects on the judicial-legal system (political, economical, social etc.) - we simply put them aside, staying in the purely legal field.[11] We will dwell only on those complex deformations of the judicial-legal system of Uzbekistan that, in our opinion, have a direct negative effect on the independence of judges putting aside complex deformations of other “sections” of the legal field. The latter are no less destructive to the positive development of post-Soviet states and, in the end, have a clearly negative effect on the independence of judges but their influence on it is, in any case, more or less indirect (it is, for example, incorrect differentiation between private law and public law, incorrect interpretation of criminal law, blending of police activity and judicial activity, etc).[12] In other words, we will discuss only internal institutional complex deformations of the legal system of Uzbekistan directly connected with the problem of the independence of judges. In our opinion, it is necessary to single out four complex deformations of this kind. One of them, with which we will begin, is a post-Soviet deformation and has an obvious political nuance while other deformations are connected mostly with the fundamental problems of interpretation of law inherited from the Soviet period of Uzbekistan’s history.
А) Complex deformation of the Uzbek judicial-legal system of post-Soviet origin
When it emerged, independent Uzbekistan did not have and could not have any positive institutional traditions of forming the judiciary. It should be recollected that Soviet judicial law was based on the fundamental principle “appointment of judges by election” but, in practice, it was an undemocratic election without any alternative that was subjected to a strict control from the party. So the transition of all post-Soviet states, including the Republic of Uzbekistan, to the “principle of appointment” when judges are appointed to office by the head of state and in relevant cases (judges of supreme courts) by the parliament was definitely a positive step. First, now the “model of appointment” itself is definitely dominant from the comparative legal point of view and does not raise any doubts from the point of view of international law, i.e. it is universal and legitimate model. Second, this model made it possible, in due season, to refuse the “principle of appointment by election” that discredited itself in the post-Soviet space and to fairly quickly depoliticize the judiciary.[13] However, very soon another problem became evident - now it is already a “complex deformation” that is clearly seen in the Uzbek judicial system. The principle of appointment of judges by the head of the state is now understood in the sense which does not correspond the international standards: according to international standards, this principle consists in legitimation of judicial functions by the highest political power elected by the people that does not participate in the selection of candidates for judges and that ensures the maximum degree of independence. But in Uzbekistan this principle is understood in almost opposite way. In the majority of post-Soviet states, including Uzbekistan, the power of the head of state to appoint judges implies that he or she has the absolute right to exercise a total control over selection of worthy candidates for judges and he or she realizes this right through his or her omnipotent administration. It is clear that with this interpretation of “appointment of judges”, a “penalty” in the form of dismissal of judges who have not justified the confidence of “the superior” is quite logical. Concerning the reasons for emergence of this deformation, one of them is obviously political: there is no doubt that the excessive interpretation of the “principle of appointment of judges” is quite corresponding to the authoritarian development of the Republic of Uzbekistan. But this should not hide from us another reason which is more dangerous in a long term prospect: when replacing soviet “appointment of judges by election” with the post-Soviet “appointment” the majority of reformers trained in the Soviet period, including liberal ones, did not realize too well constitutional and legal-technical points of the principle itself of “appointment” and its comparative legal sense. The presidential omnipotence when appointing judges even was not considered then and is not considered now (including intellectual opposition) as “deformation” - the right of the head of state, which he realized through his administration, to control, when appointing, the composition of all judges is viewed by the majority of lawyers as doctrinally legitimate and corresponding with the international legal standards. In such situation nobody is shocked by the constant control by the administration of the president over the judiciary, by emergence inside the administration of different commissions on “judicial personnel” and, in the end, the creation of the HQCSROJ. The creation of the latter, to some degree, is even viewed as a positive phenomenon, since it brings the personnel policy of the presidential structures out of the “backstage shadows” into the “regulatory legal light.” In such situation it is clear that the overcoming of the simple deformation through a desirable abolishment of the HQCSROJ (see above) will hardly give immediate positive results. Most likely, its powers simply will pass to various commissions and departments of the administration of the president. Strictly speaking, without the removal of the simple deformation in question (and this removal, first of all, should be performed at the doctrinal level[14]) we will be doomed to a vain “pursuit” of countless “simple deformations” which will assume the form of another presidential “commission”, “committee” or “department” for control over judges and, what is more, we will be doomed regardless of the political conjuncture.
B) Complex deformations in the Uzbek judicial-legal system of Soviet origin
1) Granted the level of understanding of the role of the law that had evolved during the Soviet period and, paradoxically as it may sound, has deteriorated even further in many sovereign post-Soviet states, it is unlikely that the judiciary would gain either true independence or an appropriate standing in the post-Soviet space, including the Republic of Uzbekistan. It is not even legal positivism, but rather vulgar normativism, where law is viewed not as a search for fair decisions, but as detailed and comprehensive instructions that resemble “an operation manual for some technical device”. Moreover, any attempts to go beyond the framework of the “instructive regulation” and to overcome its formalism trough the use of the fundamental legal categories (legal principles, human rights, etc.) are subject to an immediate obstruction being condemned as “judicial arbitrariness”, “departure of the principle of legality”, “loophole for corruption”, etc., which completely discredits the judicial function. At the same time, it is not possible to say that the authorities artificially impose such interpretation of law on those who do not share it, be they the society in general, or the legal community in particular. On the contrary, here, the authorities, lawyers and the society are surprisingly unanimous sincerely thinking that freedom of judicial discretion, the right of the judge to go beyond the letter of law, etc. are the absolute evil, and the judge being bound by regulatory instructions is the absolute good. In such situation the problem of the interpretation of law can be successfully solved only at the cost of significant educational efforts with the help of which it could be possible to demonstrate the lameness and backwardness of the very value system. In other words, educational and pedagogical efforts should be directed not only and not so much to the technical channel as to the axiological one. It seems important to find out the historical reasons of the emergence of such interpretation of law and sociological reasons of its current dominance (despite the integration of post-Soviet countries into the international legal space, reforms of the 1990s, etc.), which of course requires special investigations. As for the technical sphere, we, confining ourselves to the deformation of the mentality of professional lawyers (including judges themselves), will pay our attention to the dominance of incompetent ideas about the role of sources of law in the continental legal systems in post-Soviet countries. It is about a peculiar “legend about the Roman-German legal family” where a regulatory legal act is the only source of law, which serves as a theoretical justification of the radical post-Soviet normativism and supports the illusion of its “comparative legal adequacy.” In post-Soviet countries, the fundamental transformations that took place in the continental legal systems, say, in France or German, from the end of XIX and throughout ХХ when the law ceased to be all-sufficient and the center of the scientific-doctrinal analysis switched to the judicial practice, which led to the huge growth of prestige of judges and their decisions are simply unknown. The majority of post-Soviet lawyers with no access to the original sources still associate, say, the French interpretation of law with the legal centrism that dominated there soon after the adoption of the Napoleon codes up to the emergence of so-called “scientific school” (Gény, F., Saley R.) that tore the legal centrism to tatters both in theoretical area and, which is the most important, in the practical area. In this regard, we think that different discussions about a “judicial precedent” that ostensibly separates the Anglo-Saxon model of law and continental model of law, which makes it possible for the post-Soviet normativism to use the false façade of the “Roman-German legal family” as a shelter, are unproductive. In such situation adherents of the elemental standardization of ideas about sources of law and the role of judges in the legal regulation are viewed as supporters of Anglo-Saxon legal system who ostensibly try to impose on post-Soviet states that develop, so to speak, in the Roman-German direction, legal constructions that are alien to them. It seems that a debunking of the myth of the “continental legal centrism”, which requires a special attention to be paid to the evolution that took place in the last decades in Germany and France themselves where judicial rulemaking long ago took up strong positions even though it is traditionally not called a “judicial precedent” there. Only a detailed familiarization with the newest continental practice will make it possible for post-Soviet lawyers to get rid of the above-mentioned illusion of “comparative legal adequacy”. Moreover, it is necessary to overcome an idea commonly considered as proper that for a judge and an ordinary official of the executive power (including a policeman) there is the uniform and universal interpretation of law. In other words, an institutional separation of the judiciary and the executive power will not be effective if it is not supported by the idea that for an official and judge there should be different levels of interpretation (we will designate this idea as an imperative for the differentiation of the interpretation of law). If an ordinary official really should be subjected to a strict normativism, i.e. to the requirement of a scrupulous observance of the instruction, there is no, and there can be no instruction for a judge - he or she is, first of all, guided by the principles that form the basis of law. So far this thought is absolutely alien to the post-Soviet legal mentality that does not see a substantial difference between an official and a judge exactly from the point of view of the interpretation of law. For a post-Soviet lawyer both of them are just obedient “servants of law”. 2) Next complex deformation is a logical continuation of the previous one or, in other words, its concretization. It is a phenomenon of the regulatory bureaucratization of the judicial activity when a judge is completely bound not only by the will of the legislator, but also by endless instructions hidden under different names that circulate inside the judicial system and come from his or her “judicial superiors” (higher courts, chairpersons of the courts, etc.). This deformation of course is closely related to the two simple deformations of the judicial-legal system of the Republic of Uzbekistan mentioned above: The Supreme Court and the Higher Economic Court have the right to give “guiding instructions” in the form of “decrees of the plenums” and the excessive role of the chairpersons of the courts. However, in general, this is a complex deformation, since it is unlikely that legislative changes aimed at the overcoming of the indicated simple deformations will be sufficient for the debureaucratization of the judiciary, including a regulatory debureaucratization. There is a great risk that, say, “decrees of the plenums” will be replaced with some informational letters by the superior courts, with their new instructions, etc., i.e. there is a great risk of an exclusively formal solution to the problem.
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